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23 April 1948

TO : Members of the Subcommittee

FROM: Ralph Block - CIE, STATE, Chairman, SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations

The State Department member makes the following observations on the subject of "Emergency Measures":

1. Whether or not the Security Council approves the recommendation of JCS, SANACC 304/14, members of the Subcommittee have a reasonably accurate understanding of the international situation; the Subcommittee faces the prospect of emergency action under its own frame of reference just as much as if the JCS recommendation had never been made.
2. No official action has been taken yet in any quarter which changes the functions and responsibilities of the Subcommittee under its frame of reference.
3. If the Subcommittee intends to address itself to the problem of emergency measures, its responsibility in this direction is clearly described in Section 7, 304/1, Appendix "A", clauses b and c of Section 7: the preparation of plans for orderly and effective organizational transition; and the coordination of implementation of approved plans in the absence of a national wartime organization.
4. In the opinion of the State Department member, there can be no "orderly and effective organizational transition" until the Subcommittee has planned an organization, the planning of which the Subcommittee has not to date completed.
5. It is in the logical order of procedure, after the Subcommittee's organizational plan has been completed, to consider, as a development of emergency measures, and make recommendations for:
 - a. Specific personnel for key spots.
 - b. Specific equipment and facilities.
6. Subsequent to such conclusions it would appear logical to study existing facilities in the government for the relationship to the psychological warfare organization.
7. Obviously, the Subcommittee is in no position to implement the coordination of approved plans except in the

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most general organizational sense, lacking, as the Subcommittee does, the wide range of authority which has been attributed to the Director in SWNCC 304/6.

8. It is assumed that the Subcommittee has recognized by now that psychological warfare does not consist of operating a radio, dropping leaflets and carrying on any other of the physical functions of a psychological warfare agency. These are only implementing processes for an attack upon the minds of specific areas of enemy and other populations, civil and military. Such attack must be governed fundamentally by the political and security objectives of the government, coordinated with theory and principles of psychological warfare as reconciled with American tradition and practice. Without such a body of theory American psychological warfare in the event of war will continue to be a random, hit-or-miss, experimental activity depending upon ingenuity and inventiveness, which may be as often damaging to American prestige and American objectives as it may be helpful.

9. The State Department member recommends that concurrence be given with the Subcommittee's preparation of a paper on the practical aspects of emergency measures, official steps be taken immediately through SANACC to obtain, from a body composed of competent personnel for this purpose, a development of theory and principles for the performance of national psychological warfare.

cc: Col. W. L. McNamee
Cmdr. D. W. Knoll
Col. C. K. Rich

Major Max V. Brokaw